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Greetings
NASA established the Commercial Crew Program in 
order to provide human access to the International Space 
Station and low earth orbit via the commercial (non-
governmental) sector.  
A particular challenge to NASA is how to determine the 
commercial provider’s transportation system complies 
with Programmatic safety requirements while at the same 
time allowing the provider the flexibility to demonstrate 
compliance.
This will be accomplished through the use of Risk Based 
Assessment (RBA) and Shared Assurance by NASA thus 
shifting more responsibility to the Provider.  This model 
will be the focus of this presentation.
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Overview
 History
• The CCP started in 2010
• Funding was initially through research grant-like Space Act Agreements
• Also one contract to develop certification products
 Commercial Crew transportation CAPabilities (CCtCAP) Contract  Selection
• Selection announced in September 
– Two selectees: 
 Boeing
 SpaceX
• What it funds
– Two test flights and two to six missions per selectee
• Providers vs Partners
– Program still determining which term to use
• Public-Private Partnership
– NASA to be prime customer
– Provider may use vehicle for other purposes
 Alternate Standards
• Provider must comply with Programmatic standards but may propose alternate standards
– Type I – Full compliance or requires variance
– Type II – May propose Alternate Standard or demonstrate compliance
– Type III – Reference Only; may use own standards without NASA approval
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History/Current Status of CCP
 S&MA Agency requirements owned by the Technical Authority
• Flow-down and implementation owned by CCP
– Management of risks
• Primary S&MA document is NPR 8705.2, “Human-Rating Requirements for 
Space Systems”
• S&MA is a stakeholder not owner
 78 of approximately 300
 CCP determines compliance with advice of S&MA
 Disagreements
 Loss of Crew/Loss of Mission (LOC/LOM)
• Consistent with NASA’s goals and thresholds
• Part of overall certification process
• Values represent effort to increase safety of the system relative to Space Shuttle
 Compliance with ISS requirements
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Safety Requirements
 Safety Technical Review Board (STRB)
• Program’s designated Board to review Hazard Reports
• S&MA is a member, not owner, of the process
 Provides 45 day review process
• Pre-defined review team to determine acceptability 
• Multi-discipline Core Review Team
• Core Team comments consolidated, reviewed and coordinated with the ISS 
Safety Review Panel (SRP)
• Results sent to Provider for updating of material prior to Review
• Provider presents to STRB/ISS SRP
 Delegated authority from Program Control Board (PCB) to approve Hazard 
Reports
• Demonstrate compliance
• No increase in Program risk
 Initial review of safety variances
• Recommendation to PCB
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Hazard Report Review Process
 How does NASA intend on performing its assurance function?
 Through:
• Risk Based Assessments (RBA)
– A method to assess the risk associated with each Hazard Report verification
• Shared Assurance
– A process by which another assurance function (programmatic, engineering, 
etc.) is accepted by S&MA to complete its function
7
NASA Assurance
 Uses a “scoring sheet” to assess the risk related to each hazard report 
verification statement
 The scoring considers many aspects of risk:
• Likelihood of Failure
• Design Complexity
• Design Maturity
• Past Performance
 Once the risk assessment is done as part of the HR review, the output is a 
Risk Ranked Verification List 
 The Surveillance activity will then be grouped
• Witness Process (GMIP)
• Examine Product 
• Audit
• Record Review
 RBAs will be implemented by Shared Assurance
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Risk Based Assessments
 Once the RBA is completed on Provider’s Hazard Reports, CCP S&MA will 
implement a Shared Assurance model
 Shared Assurance
• Uses other organizations for assurance
– Eliminates duplication of effort
– Confidence in other organization’s personnel
– Does not create new work for the other organizations
• Does not replace S&MA
– Allows S&MA to focus limited resources in higher risk areas
 Shifts role of certification more to Provider
• Away from traditional NASA “approval”
• Service not hardware
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Shared Assurance
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Traditional Assurance vs. Shared Assurance
 RBA status
• Initial trial runs being conducted using Phase II safety data
• Team converging on a methodology
– No Plan Survives First Contact 
 Audit/Surveillance activity from the last several months 
• Planning
• Ride-a-long
• Audits conducted by others – future credit
 Audit plan forward for the next 6 months.
• Systems Safety
• Execution Plan due end of February
 Certificate of Flight Readiness (CoFR)
• A notional CoFR Plan is in work
• Describes what was completed
• Describes what was not covered
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Where Are We Now?
We feel that with the processes here, the Commercial Crew 
Program and the Safety & Mission Assurance Technical 
Authority will be well positioned to assure that the Commercial 
Providers are complying with the applicable safety requirements 
including LOC/LOM.  
Q U E S T I O N S? 
12
Summary
